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Common Cultural Property:
The Search for Rights of Protective Intervention
M. Catherine Vernon*
I should assuredly be prepared to be shot against a wall if I were
certain that by such a sacrifice I could preserve the Giotto frescoes; nor
should I hesitate for an instant ... to save Saint Mark's even if I were
aware that by doing so I should bring death to my sons. I should know
that in a hundred years from now it would matter not at all if I or my
children had survived; whereas it would matter seriously and permanent-
ly if the Piazza at Venice had been reduced to dust and ashes ....
The irreplaceable is more important than the replaceable, and the loss of
even the most valued human life is ultimately less disastrous than the
loss of something which in no circumstances can ever be created again.
Sir Harold Nicolson, 1886-1968, British author and statesman.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The protection of irreplaceable cultural heritage can be very
difficult under modem international legal traditions. Yet global concern
for cultural property takes on increasing significance since, unlike most
natural resources, archeological resources are not renewable.' The con-
cept of "common cultural property,"3 raises many legal issues in both
private and public international law. This Note will develop arguments
and discuss legal issues associated with the concept of protective inter-
vention, by other states or international organizations, in a national
government's sovereign jurisdiction over nonmoveable, culturally signifi-
cant sites located within its political boundaries. Can a right of preserva-
tion that includes a right of intervention find support in the body of in-
ternational law addressing cultural property? If so, how far can that right
go and what type of intervention is supportable?
As evidence of the world's increasing recognition of the importance
of cultural property, numerous agreements, treaties, and conventions in
international law have been developed4 to encourage the protection,
preservation, and display of the world's common cultural heritage -
that is, cultural property which is of such significance that the entire
world has an interest in its protection and preservation.5 But, to whom
does this common cultural property belong? Exactly who should control
its preservation? Difficulties arise under existing principles of interna-
tional law as to whether the concept of common cultural property, al-
though recognized in principle by various treaties and legal scholars, can
2 Clemency Coggins, Archeology and the Art Market, 175 Sa. 263, 263 (1972).
This term is used to refer to art, architecture, and archaeological sites deemed to be of
significance to the entire world, a multi-state group, or even culturally homogeneous groups not
identified with any currently recognized state - i.e. the American Indians, Palestinians, etc.
See infra parts V, VI for discussion of the historical development of these agreements.
See John H. Merryman, International Art Law: From Cultural Nationalism to a Common
Cultural Heritage, 15 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 757, 759 (1983) [hereinafter Merryman, Inter-
national Art Law].
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be applied in the reality of international relations and transnational legal
norms. Much of this difficulty stems from the focus of longstanding
traditional legal norms on territorial sovereignty, and a nationalistic
emphasis of cultural property treaties which grant control of common
cultural property to the situs state, regardless of any other interested par-
ties or states.
In view of actual state practice where existing common cultural
property is not recognized as such or is not adequately protected, exam-
ples of which will be later described in this Note, one could conclude
that the concept of common cultural property is a mere legal fiction.
That is, when existing international law is based on principles of nation-
state patrimony and the right of territorial sovereignty, this concept of
common cultural property continually bows to national legislation and
treaties upholding national responsibility for the care of cultural proper-
ty.6 As will be shown, this regime sometimes operates to the detriment
of identification and preservation efforts, which lends support to the
argument that a more effective legal framework involving internationally
sanctioned, outside intervention is warranted. Since the currently rec-
ognized nationalistic approach to the governance and protection of the
world's cultural property can be a handicap to necessary protection
efforts, it should be replaced with a more global and protective regime
that sanctions intervention under limited and controlled circumstances by
an appropriate international body.
The past two hundred years of colonialism have done much damage
to the cultural holdings of many lesser developed countries who have
reacted by tightening national controls over antiquities, often with ad-
verse effects upon archaeological efforts.7 Foreign archaeologists fre-
quently have found it difficult to obtain permission to explore and exca-
vate archaeological sites due to restrictive national policies. This often
has been compounded by the effects of strained international relations
between the host government and the government of the archaeologists'
state.' Since cultural property can be of cultural significance to more
than one state, the concept of common cultural property is meaningless
when international laws and treaties do not prevent destruction by a host
state, or allow entry by foreign groups or states for enforcement of
common interests in that property. Such intervention should be provided
6 See, e.g., Halina Nieci6wna, Sovereign Rights to Cultural Property, 4 POLISH Y.B. INT'L
L. 239, 246 (1971) (stating that "[i]n practice . . . the concern to preserve cultural heritage and
protect it against threats to diminish it, remains today almost exclusively within the sphere of
municipal lawl]").
H. CRANE MILLER, IrERNATIONAL LAW AND MARINE ARCHAEOLOGY 32 (1973).
8Id.
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for under international law.
Many articles and books have addressed the illicit transfer of art
and artifacts, and their return under a right of recovery in international
law.9 The treaties of protection and the awareness of the international
community that has developed during the past twenty years over prob-
lems of stolen cultural objects and illicit trade in art and artifacts,'0
particularly where developing countries are being harmed and exploited,
continues to be an area where protective international laws and policies
are warranted." The law concerning the preservation of archeological
and architectural sites within their country of origin, however, generally
has not been discussed.' 2 Through a discussion of the status of
nonmoveable, cultural property preservation - i.e. buildings, excavation
sites, etc. - and specific examples of the failure of existing interna-
tional law to provide effective protection, this Note will suggest the
need for a new international norm: a truly international approach to the
protection of common cultural property that includes a right of interven-
tion in the territorial sovereignty of individual states under limited and
controlled circumstances. It is a discussion of the continuing dilemma
posed, on the one hand, by the traditional notion of property rights
handed down by the Romans, and on the other hand, by the require-
ments of public and international interests which make it desirable that
archaeological sub-soil and structures, no matter which country has a
territorial claim to it, be completely included in the international public
domain for preservation rights. 3
Part II of this Note discusses specific situations where common
cultural property is being destroyed, illustrating the problems that arise
9 See generally FRANK G. HOUDEK, PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY AND ARCHAEO-
LOGICAL RESOURCES: A COMPREHENSIVE BIBLIOGRAPHY OF LAW-RELATED MATERIALS (1988)
(providing an exhaustive bibliography of resources on cultural property, many of which address
the illicit transfer of artifacts and art).
0 See generally JEANETrE GREENFIELD, THE RETURN OF CULTURAL TREASURES
(1989).
" See, e.g., Leslie S. Potter & Bruce Zagaris, Toward a Common U.S.-Mexican Cultural
Heritage: The Need for a Regional Americas Initiative in the Recovery and Return of Stolen
Cultural Property, 5 TRANSNAT'L LAW. 627, 634-36 (1992) (discussing illicit trafficking in the
cultural property of Mexico); Mark A. Gutchen, The Maya Crisis and the Law: Current United
States Legal Practice and the International Law of the Maya Antiquities Trade, 1 ARIZ. J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 283, 286 (1982) (describing the "spectacularly organized" illicit traffic in Mayan
artifacts and its devastating effects).
2 See, e.g., HOUDEK, supra note 9 (Houdek's bibliography on protection of cultural property
contains 34 pages of periodical articles on moveable cultural property, but only four pages of
articles on nonmoveable cultural property.).
'1 1 LYNDEL V. PRorr & P.3. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CULTURAL HERITAGE: DISCOVERY
AND EXCAVATION 188-89 (1984).
[Vol. 26:435
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despite existing cultural property law; this section is, therefore, support-
ive of the need to recognize an international right of intervention. The
tensions that exist between claims of territorial sovereignty and rights of
intervention for purposes of cultural protection are the subject of part
I. Part IV covers arguments favoring the doctrine of national patrimo-
ny which upholds the notion of complete control by the situs nation
based on historical ties, versus a new doctrine of protective intervention
under common rights to significant property. A discussion of the his-
torical development of the law governing cultural property, and its ori-
gins in the law of war, is provided in part V. This discussion on the
law of cultural property continues in part VI, which provides a survey
of the definition of common cultural property under existing internation-
al law, and describes how most current treaties are ineffective because
of their emphasis on rights of host states. It will also show, however,
examples in the development of cultural property law that are sometimes
contrary to traditional property law concepts and which are useful in
developing arguments for protective intervention. Part VII discusses the
concept of common cultural heritage in the context of the Law of the
Sea Convention, and its usefulness in arguments favoring a
multijurisdictional approach to control of common heritage found on
land. Part VIII concludes, and in the process suggests how common
cultural property laws for immovable property and archeological sites
can, and should, provide a meaningful and effective international frame-
work for the treatment of property deemed to be part of the world's
common cultural heritage.
Without developing the specific details of the proper methods of
defining or administering protective cultural intervention, which could
involve years of writing by scores of international representatives and
legal scholars, this Note argues only for the recognition of rights of
intervention. Once accepted as a norm whose time is due, international
effort and cooperation can ultimately develop a framework for the use
of diplomatic and non-military intervention by an apolitical, international
body that has clearly delineated which properties are to be considered
common culture, and what protective action is necessary. The concept is
based on rights of protective entry, not removal.'4 The ultimate goal is
" The term "protective entry" means steps taken to prevent destruction of immoveable cul-
tural property, whether that destruction is from the omission of acts to prevent natural aging and
erosion, or from overt acts of looting, war, or improper excavation. Protective intervention, for
example, would sanction internationally coordinated efforts to stop deterioration of the Sphinx,
which, "according to . . . [the] chairman of the Egyptian Antiquities Organization, has deteriorat-
ed more in the past 50 years than in all the previous centuries of its existence." Saving the
Sphinx, ARCHAEOLOGY, Nov.-Dec. 1990, at 27.
Protective intervention would also be applied to prevent serious damage from improper
439
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the elimination of the current status of protective laws as mere legal
fiction, recognized in name only, without incidents or rights that provide
adequate de facto protection.
II. WHY INTERVENTION IS NEEDED
There are many recent examples of failures to protect common
cultural property. These situations provide a basis for the argument that
the current protective regime, which does not authorize intervention,
should be improved upon by adding the right of intervention in those
limited circumstances where it is both necessary and possible to prevent
further destruction.
A. Problems in Latin America
Despite existing laws for the protection of the common cultural
heritage, 5 one recent example of failure to protect common culture is
found in the Mayan Indian ruins of Latin America. Spread over a geo-
graphic region that now includes several Central American states, 6 the
Mayan heritage is of common cultural significance to each of these
states, including Mexico, Guatemala, El Salvador, Costa Rica, and
Belize. In an effort to enhance their cooperative preservation effort,
these five countries have agreed to join forces to promote and preserve
the area in a multi-million dollar project intending to showcase the
history and culture of the entire region as, in the words of the Mexican
Minister of Tourism, "one entity without borders . . . ." While this
agreement is not a binding international treaty, it is evidence of govern-
mental recognition and opinion regarding Mayan culture among the five
countries. Yet, recently the El Salvadoran government failed to prevent
the United States from building a new $80 million embassy on a Mayan
village site, despite a detailed report in 1986 by El Salvador's National
Museum that recommended the area be protected."
activities regarding significant archaeological sites, such as the damage that occurred to two of
Easter Island's most famous statues during the production of silicone molds by two German
organizations, to be used in making replicas of the statues for a museum exhibition in Germany
and Belgium. See Easter Island Disaster, ARCHAEOLOGY, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 15, 71.
" See infra parts V, VI.
6 Gutchen, supra note 11, at 284.
'7 Mundo Maya, ARCHAEOLOGY, Mar.-Apr. 1991, at 14.
" See Land Developers Ruin Salvador Treasures, (National Public Radio broadcast, Aug. 15,
1992). It was reported that:
Archaeologists say the site just west of San Salvador is potentially one of
the most important in Central America . . . . The bulldozing went ahead
despite a declaration by the government's National Council for Art and
440 [Vol. 26:435
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This example can be interpreted as evidence that the current frame-
work for protecting common cultural property often fails, - i.e. written
reports and requests are ineffective in saving a culturally significant site.
The concept of common heritage is a mere legal fiction in these situa-
tions. El Salvador is a signatory to the World Heritage Convention. 9
Further, as a member of the Organization of American States, it adopted
the Convention of San Salvador, the purpose of which is to safeguard
the cultural heritage of the American nations2 Despite the fact that
these five countries themselves have recognized their common Mayan
heritage and cultural property, no apparent protective rights subsequently
flow from this recognition for states other than El Salvador since inter-
national laws and treaties do not prevent destruction by the host state, or
allow the other states the right to preserve the site. It is obvious to
scholars that the San Salvador treaty has not been effective.2 As evi-
Culture in July that the site should be protected as a national treasure ....
The new $80 million United States Embassy is only a few hundred yards
away. The fortresslike complex covers 26 acres and was supposed to have
been modeled on a Mayan village. In fact, it was probably built on one.
Id. Despite the art council's declaration, the United States embassy staff "say that if the site had
historical importance, they know nothing about it." Id. See also In El Salvador, the Builders of
a New Housing Subdivision are Being Accused of Destroying an Important Pre-Columbian
City . .. , (Monitor Radio broadcast, Sept. 18, 1992) [on file with Case W. Res. J. Int'l L.].
The destruction of Cuscatlan, the archeological site near the new United States embassy and
former capital of the Aztec-related Pipil Civilization "underscored the El Salvadoran
Government's inability or unwillingness to honor laws protecting ecological and historical sites."
Id.
Indeed, the United States could be found to be one of the world's worst offenders in the
preservation of common culture. For example, "experts estimate that fewer than 10% of the
prehistoric Membres [Indian] sites in southwestern New Mexico are free from damage due to
looting and vandalism." See Carol Ann Bassett, The Culture Thieves, SCIENCE, July-Aug. 1986,
at 22, quoted in OFFICE OF TECHNOLOGY, UNITED STATES CONGRESS, TECHNOLOGIES FOR PRE-
HISTORIC AND HISTORIC PRESERVATION 15 n. 5 (1986).
19 U.S. Dept. of State Treaties in Force, Jan. 1, 1993, at 420 (June, 1993). The 1972 Con-
vention Concerning the Protection of World Cultural and Natural Heritage, Nov. 23, 1972, 27
U.S.T. 37, 40 (1972) [hereinafter World Heritage Convention], drafted under the direction of the
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) and signed by at
least 107 states, recognizes "that deterioration or disappearance of any item of the cultural or
natural heritage constitutes a harmful impoverishment of the heritage of all the nations of the
world," and sets forth the strongest international protective regime for common cultural property.
See discussion infra part VI(C).
" Convention on the Protection of the Archeological, Historical, and Artistic Heritage of the
American Nations, June 16, 1976, art. 1, 15 I.L.M. 1350 (1976) [hereinafter Convention of San
Salvador]; see also infra part VI(B)(2). The Convention has as its purpose to "safeguard the
property making up the cultural heritage of the American nations in order . . . to promote coop-
eration among the American states for mutual awareness and appreciation of their cultural prop-
erty." Id. (emphasis added).
21 James A.R. Nafziger, International Penal Aspects of Protecting Cultural Property, 19
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denced by the failure of these existing treaties, a different normative
principle providing rights of access and protective control is warranted
under international law and should be developed.
B. Problems In Time of War
Despite numerous provisions in various treaties addressing the law
of war providing for the protection of cultural objects,' the climate
and necessity of destructive combat continue to create situations where
protection of cultural and historical sites, along with protection of the
civilian population, for that matter, becomes subordinate or even nonex-
istent when weighed against the goals of a so-called military victory.
When an archeological team visited Iraq in 1992, a year after the end of
the "Dessert Storm" allied attack on that country in retaliation for its
1991 invasion and occupation of Kuwait, it found that Iraq's antiquities
had been damaged by the Gulf War and subsequent civil unrest, and
were continuously imperiled by the international embargo against Iraq.'
As part of more generalized attacks on government institutions,
many significant archeological sights were damaged, if not ruined, since
"bombing Iraq is like blowing up the Louvre without hurting the paint-
ings. '  The city of Ur, near which an Iraqi air base had been located,
had four bomb craters, and bullet holes pockmark the southeastern face
of its most prominent feature, the ziqqurat dedicated to the Moon god
INT'L LAW. 835, 841 n.23 (1985) [hereinafter Nafziger, International Penal Aspects]. Nafziger
finds support for his statement that "the Convention has not been effective" in the comments of
Terence A. Todman, Ass't Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, Department of State, to Ambas-
sador Rodolfo Silva, Chairman of the Permanent Council of Organization of American States, on
August 26, 1977. Todman stated, "we believe the convention . . . is too broad in scope and
rigid in its enforcement provisions . . . . It would impose an administrative burden on regional
customs services which no state can be expected to accept and would also encourage the con-
tinued growth of a black market." Id.
2 See, e.g., Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, Aug. 12, 1949, art. 30, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, 308; Hague Convention with
Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on Land, July 29, 1899, 32 Stat. 1803; Hague Con-
vention IV Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, art. 27, 36 Stat.
2277; Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict and
Protocol, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215, noted in Michael D. Diederich, Jr., "Law of War"
and Ecology - A Proposal for a Workable Approach to Protecting the Environment Through the
Law of War, 136 MIL. L. REV. 137, 146-47 (1992).
' Mesopotamia in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, ARCHEOLOGY, May-June 1992, at 24.
24 Alan Sipress, The Past and Present Collide in Iraq: Gulf War Rocks the Cradle of Civili-
zation, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 21, 1991, at E2. "The landscape teems with ruins of mankind's
earliest cities . . . . By the ruins of Ur, the ancient Mesopotamian city where Abraham is said
to have been born, stands an Iraqi air base - a prime target for U.S. fighter bombers." Id.
442 [Vol. 26:435
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Nanna.' Furthermore, in order to stave off mass starvation, agricultural
and irrigation projects have cut into areas that would have previously
been under archaeological surveys and international rescue efforts.26 As
could be expected in a time of war and breakdown in civil order, sur-
vival and safety of cultural property became subordinate to more funda-
mental concerns for survival of the population.27 While military inter-
vention was the proximate cause of this destruction, the initial placement
of those military targets near such internationally significant cultural
sites was the result of a domestic government without regard for any
consequential infringement or destruction of the cultural interests of
others. International protection of such universally important sites should
have been insured prior to the opening of hostilities. Protective monitor-
ing and intervention, where necessary, might have prevented using such
cultural locations as military installations."
Similarly, the war in the former Yugoslavia has caused massive
cultural destruction, to the point of being labelled "cultural genocide"
z Mesopotamia in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra note 23, at 24.
Id. The detrimental effects on archeological preservation efforts are not limited to the
country under attack. Jordan, dependent upon Iraq for most of its oil needs, was effectively cut
off from that supply as a result of the United Nations trade embargo against Iraq. To alleviate
its pressing need for oil, it commenced destructive oil-shale mining in a 100 square-mile area
east of the Dead Sea. While this area contains some of Jordan's richest oil-shale deposits, it also
is home to some 550 archeological sites, including 250,000-year-old Palaeolithic rock shelters and
a twelfth century Crusader castle. Archaeologists attempting to minimize the destruction hope that
Jordan remembers that this is "the world's heritage they are preserving in this cradle of civiliza-
tion . . . [and] will do the right thing." Salvaging Ruins in Jordan, ARCHAEOLOGY, Jan.-Feb.
1993, at 23-24.
' "Under such circumstances, nobody in Iraq is particularly concerned with archaeology."
Mesopotamia in the Aftermath of the Gulf War, supra note 23, at 24.
' While it is difficult to envision Iraq moving an air base because it was near an archeo-
logical site, this is precisely the argument that must be made. If the air base was specifically
located because of its proximity to a site considered part of the world's heritage, world monitor-
ing and protective intervention prior to times of war should attempt to cause the air base to be
closed in order to ward off destruction of the cultural site. A better - and more realistic -
way to accomplish protection, however, is to focus early world attention on acts against the
world's common heritage, and coordinate some form of internationally sanctioned entry to inspect
and stop the construction of an air base before it is completed on an important archeological
site.
This argument is supported by those involved in archeological preservation:
The Gulf War is not the first conflict in recent history to threaten archaeo-
logical sites. Our world patrimony has been under siege during 16 years of
civil war in Beirut and during the decades of fighting in Vietnam and Cam-
bodia. We must demand that governments involved in future conflicts give
assurance that cultural remains will be protected.
Martha Sharp-Joukowsky, From the President, ARCHAEOLOGY, May-June 1991, at 6 (emphasis
added).
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when referring to the destruction of Sarajevo's churches, mosques, and
libraries, many of which were built in the fourteenth and fifteenth centu-
ries. 9 Croatia's Dubrovnik underwent similar havoc when, from Octo-
ber, 1991 to early 1992, Serbian shelling destroyed sixty-three percent of
the city's available living space - over 461 houses or monuments -
in this historical town considered one of the most outstanding historical
towns in Europe, and included on the World Heritage List by
UNESCO as part of mankind's cultural heritage.3
Motivated by this mass destruction of common cultural property,
the Italian government has proposed that U.N. inspectors monitor the
world's cultural heritage, and that the international community share
responsibility for cultural sites on UNESCO's World Heritage List of
major monuments.32 It has been suggested that UNESCO be given
powers similar to those of the inspectors of the International Atomic
Energy Agency, including the power to enter sovereign territory, in
order to check on the application of the 1972 World Heritage Conven-
tion.33 Unfortunately, the Italians withdrew the proposal when it met
stiff opposition from the Executive Board of UNESCO, particularly the
Omani, Chinese, and Egyptian speakers at the meeting who indicated
that their countries were unwilling to give up authority over their own
territory or cultural treasures.34 France, on the other hand, had a more
favorable response to and recognition of the concept of protective inter-
vention, indicating that it would support the concept of ideas but not
policemen.35 Of course, it is precisely this type of a non-military, pro-
tective international regulatory agency which was proposed by the Ital-
ians. The achievement of such a proposal is dependent upon increased
international advocacy for a team of knowledgeable cultural property
advisors with an internationally recognized right to enter, inspect, recom-
29 Roger Boyes, This is Cultural Genocide, THE TIMES (London), Aug. 28, 1992.
o The 1972 World Heritage Convention, supra note 19, art. 11(2), provides that member
states submit an inventory to the World Heritage Committee of their property "forming part of
the cultural and natural heritage." Submissions of such inventories from member states comprise
the World Heritage List, which is then distributed to members at least every two years. Id.
" Jean-Paul Cadoret, Shells Wreaked Havoc on Historic Port, Official Says, AGENCE FRANCE
PRESSE, Apr. 25, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, AFP File.
32 Italy Drops Scheme for Monument Inspectors, The Reuter Library Report, May 22, 1992,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File.
" Paul Taylor, Italy Proposes U.N. Cultural Heritage Inspectors, The Reuter Library Report,
May 14, 1992, available in LEXIS, News Library, Reuwld File (indicating that "[o]ne might
conceive of a system of actual protection, with a team of inspectors similar to the one created
within the International Atomic Energy Agency... to check on the non-proliferation agree-
ment[]").
' Italy Drops Scheme for Monuments Inspectors, supra note 32.
35 id.
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mend, and implement protective action for the common cultural heritage
of mankind.
Ill. ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTERVENTION:
TERRITORIAL SOVEREIGNTY VS. COMMON CULTURAL PROPERTY
Cultural property, as the testimony of the creative genius and histo-
ry of peoples, is a basic element of their identity.36 Some believe that
the solidarity of the international community, which has developed in
recent decades, can be further intensified in both the political and hu-
manitarian spheres by an increased concern for the protection of cultural
property.37 As a result, recognition of a duty to protect not only their
own cultural property, but that of other nations as well, has led to in-
creased international cooperation in the field of preservation.38 Yet,
most treaties39 and customary international law' recognize the inalien-
ability of property located within national boundaries, and a nation's
superior claim to property when it is the country of origin.4
A. The Tradition of Territorial Sovereignty
The theory of territorial control over common cultural property,
along with everything else within a state's political boundaries, devel-
oped from the nineteenth century idea of the nation-state and the rela-
tionship between the particular great powers of that time.42 The growth
of classical international law reflecting the emphasis upon the nation and
national territorial sovereignty is believed to have derived from political
circumstances directly related to the nineteenth century function of inter-
national law of bringing a minimum order to relations between states by
imposing certain restraints upon their sovereignty.43 During the 18s the
' Koen De Jager, Claims to Cultural Property Under International Law, 1 LEIDEN J. INT'L
L. 183, 190 (1988).
" J. Crabb, International Humanitarian Law and the Protection of Cultural Property, Y.B.
INT'L INST. HUMANnTARIAN L. 267, 269 (1986).
' Alan Marchisotto, Note, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 717 (1974).
3 See infra part VI.
' Among states "the recognition of the existing territorial link between the cultural property
and a definitive territory has become a generally accepted principle of international law." De
Jager, supra note 36, at 190.
"' See, e.g., Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 21, at 850 (indicating that
"[jinternational comity and conventional law vest legislative powers to protect cultural property in
the state of originf]").
4 Francois Duchene, The Political Aspects of Intervention in Present Day International Poli-
tics II, in INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS 92 (Louis G.M. Jaquet ed., 1971).
11 HENRY J. STEINER & DETLEV F. VAGTS, TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL PROBLEMS 372-73
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idea of sovereign, independent nation-states was greatly fortified by the
spread of democratic concepts originating in the French and American
revolutions, one consequence of which was to make external intervention
in a country's internal arrangements an act hostile to that country's
government, as well as an infringement on the right of self-determina-
tion of the people.'
The United Nations Charter specifically addressed non-intervention
in article 2(4) which states that "[a]ll Members shall refrain in their
international relations from the threat or use of force against the territo-
rial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other
manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations."'4 The
1965 U.N. Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the
Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and
Sovereignty further supported the law against intervention and was unan-
imously adopted by the General Assembly.'
B. New Norms of Intervention
Regarding common cultural property, however, modem national and
political boundaries have only limited relevance when it comes to the
location of historical and archaeological remains.' The entire concept
of culture defies using geopolitical boundaries as demarcations since
culture is neither normally nor historically derived from a territory;
rather, culture develops from the societal traditions of a people.' Cur-
rent national boundaries often have no connection or alignment with the
(1986).
" Kenneth G. Younger, Intervention: The Historical Development I, in INTERVENTION IN
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 42, at 17.
41 U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, T 4.
' Karl Kaiser, The Political Aspects of Intervention in Present Day International Politics I,
in INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 42, at 84 (referencing the U.N. Decla-
ration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention in the Domestic Affairs of States and Protection of
Their Independence and Sovereignty).
Henry Cleere, Foreward to PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 13, at vi.
' "One way of thinking about cultural property . . . is as components of a common human
culture whatever their places of origin or present location, independent of property rights or
national jurisdiction." John H. Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property, 80
Am. J. INT'L L. 831, 831 (1986) [hereinafter Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking].
Cultural rights are considered human rights, not territorial rights, as evidenced by their
mention in the United Nations Covenants on Human Rights. The International Covenant on Eco-
nomic, Social, and Cultural Rights, part of the Covenants on Human Rights, "recognize[s] the
right of everyone: (a) To take part in cultural life ... [and] (c) To benefit from the protection
of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of
which he is the author." International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, 1966,
art. 15, 6 I.L.M. 360, 365.
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peoples that inhabited the land in past centuries and left cultural clutter
as evidence of their existence. Culture is def'med by linguistic, religious,
or other criteria, not by an artificially placed boundary line.49
The Cold War and the nuclear age have contributed to the develop-
ment and apparent acceptance of "minor coercion," or unarmed interven-
tion, as opposed to the age-old but cruder forms of military intervention
and physical coercion." A common sense analysis indicates that the
development of various forms of political coercion and intervention
without the use of force in the nuclear age was both necessary and
inevitable; the need to exercise restraint in the use of nuclear weapons
was and remains mandatory for world preservation. From this and other
modem trends, the evidence of a breakdown in the traditional concept of
territorial sovereignty, when applied to non-military settings, is apparent.
In particular, claims for an uncompromising observance of the
sovereignty of underdeveloped countries, often clash with the necessities
required to induce social reform and economic efficiency. This suggests
that intervention has become so frequent and varied in its forms of
implementation that it is already an essential part of many structural
elements of the contemporary international order.5' The sovereign state
begins to take on less significance in international relations which fre-
quently involve independent international players and global, as opposed
to national, concerns.52 In the "highly individualistic" and "mass-con-
sumer society" of the twentieth century, there are an infinite number of
individual contracts made by persons or groups irrespective of national
Thomas C. Carey, Self-Determination in the Post-Colonial Era: Case of Quebec, 1 AM.
SOC. INT'L LJ. 47, 55 (1977).
' Wiliam T. Burke, The Legal Regulation of Minor International Coercion: A Framework
of Inquiry, in ESSAYS ON INTrERVENrON 63, 87 (Roland J. Stanger ed., 1964). In support of this
line of reasoning, there is a belief among scholars that
Since the 19th century's populist nation state became the 20th century's
mass consumer society, the problem is not to 'stop' intervention but to turn
it from a military or quasi-military force into a civilian process and from a
civilian process in which there is a strong sense of exploitation into one of
joint decision-making . . . . Final world-wide legal order can be furthered
by constructive intervention of states or international organisations.
Louis G.M. Jaquet, Introduction to INTERVENTION IN INTERNATIONAL POLITICS, supra note 4 , at
Vii.
Kaiser, supra note 46, at 83.
'z It is now recognized that "[t]he major structures and processes that affect us are glob-
al . . . [and] [t]he state is no longer the only great mediator between 'out there' and 'in here,'
between foreign policy and domestic politics, between capital and labor, between First World and
Third World, between self and other." R.BJ. WALKER, ONE WORLD, MANY WORLDS: STRUG-
GLES FOR A JUST WORLD PEACE 165 (1988).
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frontiers or relationships not defined as any political body or state.53
Further, the international arena is coming to realize that while states are
by no means irrelevant, they "are becoming too big to respond to the
needs of people[,] and too small to respond to the globalization of capi-
tal or the challenges of militarization and environmental collapse. 54
The protection of common cultural property easily falls into this
category of challenges. As a result, the doctrine of unqualified condem-
nation of all forms of intervention should be replaced by a doctrine of
conditional intervention,5 particularly if common cultural property
rights are to be recognized and enforceable. Despite provisions of the
U.N. Charter concerning sovereign equality,56 and despite what nations
themselves believe, the fact remains that the world continues to be com-
prised of a stratified society57 between developed and developing na-
tions. A primary assumption underlying the doctrine of sovereign equali-
ty and nonintervention is that, to avoid outside interference, nations must
be fully equipped to manage their own affairs. While nations with an
unfortunate economic past or with political handicaps can easily become
victims of foreign exploitation,59 their inhabitants - including people
and common cultural property - can also be viewed as victims of
location by virtue of finding themselves housed within that nation. If a
nation is not fully equipped to manage common cultural property located
within its territorial boundaries, its capacity as a sovereign equal be-
comes questionable under the standards of the international communi-
ty.6' Interference in the form of protective intervention becomes justifi-
able in such situations.6
" Duchene, supra note 42, at 93.
WALKER, supra note 52, at 165.
5 Kaiser, supra note 46, at 85.
U.N. CHARTER, art. 2, [ 1 ("The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its Members.").
11 RADHARAMAN CHAKRABARTI, INTERVENTION AND THE PROBLEM OF ITS CONTROL IN THE
TWENTIETH CENTURY 209 (1974).
I' ld. at 208.
5 Id. at 209.
60 Id.
61 Even if a country such as the United States is not considered ill-equipped to fund protec-
tive efforts yet fails to do so, see supra note 18, this argument holds true. Intervention is jus-
tifiable because any state that refuses to organize and/or allocate proper resources at levels meet-
ing internationally desired standards for cultural protection is acting sub-equally to those who
properly protect the cultural heritage. States that refuse should be subject to external interference
in their internal operations and administration regarding common cultural property.
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IV. MoRE ARGUMENTS AGAINST INTERVENTION:
NATIONAL PATRIMONY VS. COMMON CULTURAL PROPERTY
In addition to claims of territorial sovereignty as an argument
against protective intervention, many nations claim that treasures located
within their boundaries are part of their national patrimony62 rather than
the common heritage of mankind.63 Cultural heritage takes on particular
significance in this manner with the lessor economically and politically
developed states.' In its purest form, the concept of national cultural
patrimony views cultural objects produced, or first discovered, within a
state as belonging to that state based on the special relationship between
that state's people and their cultural artifacts." In fact, a basic principle
of cultural property preservation is that cultural objects, as basic ele-
ments of civilization and national culture, can only be fully appreciated
in close connection with accurate information as to their origin, history,
and traditional status.'
But often these claims are based on the mere physical presence of
a work in the claiming country, without exclusive cultural attachment.67
6 The word "patrimony" in a domestic context is used to mean property which has de-
scended within the same family, in a direct line from the father, and by extension, from the
mother, as well as the total mass of existing or potential rights and liabilities attached to a per-
son for the satisfaction of his economic needs. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1015 (5th ed. 1979).
Its use by legal scholars in an international context, preceded by the term "national" has appar-
ently become a term of art in the discussion of international cultural property rights, as evi-
denced by its frequent use throughout the various articles and books consulted in preparation of
this Note, and referenced herein.
"National patrimony" is interpreted by this author to mean the property rights of a nation
as one international unit, including claims of control and ownership of cultural artifacts and sites
with which that nation can trace an historical relationship through lineage or territory. Use of the
term in this Note is based on this interpretation.
' Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 21, at 847.
64
[The establishment of cultural identity in emergent nations is a fundamental
one . . . constitut[ing] tangible and monumental proof of distinct nationhood.
The constitutions of many of the "new" states of the postwar world contain
comprehensive statutes asserting state ownership and control over all the
vestiges of the past within their frontiers, whether "portable" or monumental,
in private or in public hands.
PRorr & O'KEEE, supra note 13, at v.
' Douglas N. Thomason, Rolling Back History: The United Nations General Assembly and
the Right to Cultural Property, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 47, (1990). This explanation will
be referred to as the "national patrimony doctrine."
I Nieci6wna, supra note 6, at 249. See also infra note 166 (discussing the negative impact
of "de-contextualization" on the archaeological and ethnological value of cultural property).
67 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 690.
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As in the case of the Acropolis of Greece or the Great Pyramids of
Egypt,68 for example, or any other internationally significant sites with-
in a given state, the weaknesses of the doctrine of national patrimony
come to light: it could effectively cut off the bulk of humanity from
exposure to that great civilization.69 Under the national patrimony doc-
trine,70 and its reliance on the law of the situs to govern access and
protection of cultural property, other states cannot influence the fate of
commonly significant property, despite the property's importance to the
common heritage of mankind.7 This was painfully shown by the Chi-
nese Cultural Revolution and its destructive effects on cultural property
within the People's Republic.72
Further support for national patrimony claims of control over cul-
tural property comes from those politicians and historians who argue
that pride in past achievements can increase the attachment of citizens to
current social and political structures associated with that tradition."
Experience shows that politically motivated cultural associations may be
argued from racial descent, territorial coincidence, or even from mere
cultural sympathy.74 Some observable examples in this century include
Iran under the Shah, Kampuchea as heir to the Khmer culture, Israel as
heir to Hebrew culture, and many modem African States.75 Cultural
See, e.g., De Jager, supra note 36, at 190-91. De Jager states that it is
difficult if not impossible to determine which state is to be considered the
country of origin. Is for example, modem Egypt the heir of the ancient art
from that region? Or even less clear, who can claim the old Jewish art
treasures from Eastern Europe: Poland, Israel or the Soviet Union?
Id. See also Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 837 (stating that "[a]s the
smog of Athens eats away the marble fabric of the Parthenon, all of mankind loses something
irreplaceable[]").
' Thomason, supra note 65, at 94-95. Cf., comments of Dr. James W. Flanagan, Professor
of Religion at Case Western Reserve University and active field archaeologist in Jordan, who
indicated that the destructive use of archeological sites by the local population should always be
within their prerogative, since such activity constitutes cultural evolution, not destruction. Inter-
view with Dr. James Flanagan, Case Western Reserve University, in Cleveland, Ohio (Dec. 16,
1992).
70 See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
7' De Jager, supra note 36, at 189.
72 Id.
71 PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 13, at 23-24. Dr. Caroline S. Steele, Post Doctoral
Fellow in Religion at Case Western Reserve University and Mesopotamian archaeologist, agrees
with this theory, indicating that the cultural heritage and archeological riches located in present-
day Iraq are frequently used by Sadam Hussein and the Baat party as a tool of political unifica-
tion. Interview with Dr. Caroline S. Steele, Post Doctoral Fellow in Religion at Case Western
Reserve University, in Cleveland, Ohio (Dec. 16, 1992).
71 PRorr & O'KEEFE, supra note 13, at 23-24.
75 Id.
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association as a nationalistic medium can take on deep significance for
the people of a country in terms of identification and unification.76
To these ends, unfortunately, national patrimony is sometimes ma-
nipulated, its stories and history rewritten in efforts to use the past as
propaganda for a current regime.' The National Socialist Regime in
Germany under Hitler's Third Reich was notorious for its use and abuse
of the past for imperialist and racist purposes, invoking the concept of
Kulturkreis, the identification of ethnic regions based on excavated cul-
tural materials, and then using this theory to support Nazi expansionist
aims in central and eastern Europe.7" The flaws inherent in basing cul-
tural property rights on national patrimony arguments become even more
evident in the context of such abusive examples as the Third Reich.79
While nation-states, as the primary political category in international
relations, may resolve the age-old tension between being a person and
being part of a particular culture in a particular territory, the notion is
considered an historically specific resolution, increasingly out of touch
with contemporary realities."0 Sometimes nationalistic claims by citizens
of newly emerged states to preserve and retain their cultural heritage are
dismissed by those in more settled conditions as "wholly selfish.""t
Often the practice of hoarding cultural objects serves no discernible
domestic purpose, other than asserting rights to keep them. The practice
instead leads to multiple examples of artifacts of earlier civilizations
being retained by nations, unavailable for study by domestic or foreign
76 This was explained in the words of one Indian writer:
Archaeology has come to acquire for modem India a significance which is
at once deeper and subtler than a strict definition of the term as a scientific
discipline would seem to imply . . . . It has enabled her to establish her
lost links with a great past whose magnificence was beyond her distant
dreams . . . . It is something deeply rooted in the country's very existence,
and constitutes almost a moral and spiritual necessity.
Id.
7 See generally Bettina Arnold, The Past as Propaganda, ARCHAEOLOGY, July-Aug. 1992, at
30 (providing a brief historical summary of rulers who have manipulated cultural history for po-
litical ends, including the Persian ruler Darius I - 521-486 B.C.-, the first century Roman
historian Tacitus, and Germany's Third Reich under Hitler from 1933 to 1945).
78 Id.
' The Nazi Doctrine of Hitler was "ethnocentric, racist, and genocidal," in its belief that the
Germanic culture of Europe was responsible for all major intellectual and technological achieve-
ments of Western civilization. German archaeological publications from 1933 to 1945 showed
maps of the Germanic homeland as the "center of diffusionary waves bringing civilization to less
developed cultures to the south, west, and east." Id. at 32. Hitler went so far as to refer to the
Greeks "as Germans who had survived a northern natural catastrophe and evolved a highly de-
veloped culture in southern contexts." Id.
WALKER, supra note 52, at 163-64.
RI PROTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 13, at 25.
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scholars, and contributing to the cultural impoverishment of people in
other parts of the world.82 While this argument is generally raised in
regards to moveable cultural property, it is equally applicable to im-
moveable monuments and archeological sites.
From the viewpoint of several culturally impoverished states, there
was justification for these culturally isolationistic policies. Mexican law
for example, explicitly states that archaeological objects are in-
alienable,83 a legal scheme prompted by the Mexican experience with
the "wholesale dismemberment" of its ancient pre-Columbian sites. 4
For similar reasons, Peru also retains works of earlier cultures that it
does not adequately conserve or display, thus endangering mankind's
cultural heritage in "destructive retention" or "covetous neglect," accord-
ing to some. 5
It is generally acknowledged that the role of colonialism in deplet-
ing the cultural resources of Africa explains developing nations'
isolationistic focus, as was Zaire's during the U.N. General Assembly
discussion of the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohib-
iting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Owner-
ship of Cultural Property.86 In the words of President Mobutu:
During the colonial period we suffered not only from colonialism,
slavery, economic exploitation, but also and above all from the barba-
rous systematic pillaging of all our works of art. In this way the rich
countries appropriated our best, our unique works of art, and we are
therefore poor not only economically but also culturally . ... .
Further support for this argument is evidenced by the fact that the mu-
seums of Europe and the United States are filled with artifacts looted by
soldiers, colonial administrators, explorers, archaeologists, or treasure-
hunting entrepreneurs.8
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 847.
's Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 711.
84 Id.
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 846.
Thomason, supra note 65, at 50 (referencing the 1970 UNESCO Convention on the Illicit
Movement of Art Treasures, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231).
87 Id.
8 Cleere, supra note 47, at v. Cleere indicates that "[t]he serious student of the Sumerians
or the Maya, the Egyptians or the Khmer, finds his finest raw material in Paris or London,
Philadelphia or Berlin." Id.
See also Ann P. Prunty, Toward Establishing an International Tribunal for the Settlement of
Cultural Property Disputes: How to Keep Greece From Losing its Marbles, 72 GEO. LJ. 1155,
1155 (1984) (providing a discussion of the attempts by Greece to obtain the return of the "Elgin
Marbles" - statutes, friezes, and metopes from the Parthenon and other Athenian buildings -
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In view of the negative isolationist effects on common cultural
property that can result from policies based on the doctrine of national
patrimony emphasized in existing cultural treaties,89 it is time to bal-
ance this nationalistic legal focus with a framework that openly sanc-
tions rights of intervention. The protective trend in cultural property law
that began during the 1970s in an effort to stop foreign looting and
exploitation?" should continue. But, there are other risks created by
such isolationism: such as failure by that host state to provide adequate
protection to common cultural property, while excluding other states and
interest groups from assisting in preventing its destruction.9' Providing
a better balancing under international norms addressing common cultural
property is warranted where such risks become reality.
An unfortunate result of such foreign exploitation has been retalia-
tion by some host countries who have excluded foreign scholars.9' The
concept of common cultural property, however, demands recognition of
a dual accountability by host nations - both of its own cultural heri-
tage, and of the heritage of all mankind.93 Advocates of the principal
of common cultural heritage believe that property is most valuable in its
contributions to understanding universal human culture; the claim of the
states of origin becomes secondary to the human interest in the common
history.94 The importance of great archaeological treasures, such as the
Parthenon in Athens,9" to modem cultural life gives all societies a spe-
which were removed a century-and-a-half ago by Lord Elgin, then British Ambassador to Con-
stantinople, and which remain housed in the British Museum).
See infra parts V, VI.
0 See infra part VI.
9, See, e.g., Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 846 (indicating by way of
example that "Peru retains works of earlier cultures that, according to newspaper reports, it does
not adequately conserve or display[]"). While this is an example of moveable cultural property,
the thought process of cultural nationalism undoubtedly applies equally to nonmoveable cultural
objects. It is noted that in the case of moveable cultural objects like those in Peru, "[t]o a cul-
tural nationalist the destruction of national cultural property through inadequate care is regrettable,
but might be preferable to its 'loss' through export." Id. One wonders if intervention to assist in
preservation would be more acceptable than loss to destruction, however, since there is no at-
tempt to remove or export the cultural objects. Cultural nationalists might not, in the end, put
forth such strong resistance as anticipated as long as the property is not leaving their country.
9 Coggins, supra note 2, at 265 (stating, "[o]ne disastrous corollary of such exploitation
arises when the aggrieved country retaliates by excluding American scholars, as has happened
selectively in Turkey and may soon happen in Indiaf]").
93 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 690 (indicating that "[s]tates are responsible, however, not
only to their own people, but also to the broader civilization of which they are a partf]").
Thomason, supra note 65, at 48.
The Parthenon, dating to the mid-fifth century B.C., has been described as "the most
cherished monument of Western civilization." Spencer P.M. Harrington, Shoring Up The Temple
of Athena, ARCHAEOLOGY, Jan.-Feb. 1992, at 30, 32.
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cial interest in their preservation, to the subordination of conventional
property concepts.9 6 This includes notions of traditional private property
rights under domestic law,' and the concept of territorial sovereignty
under international law,98 both of which support the right to exclude
anyone or anything from interfering with a recognized property right.
However, based on the recognized international importance of the cultur-
al heritage of mankind, the unrestricted alienation of culturally important
property by a host state can no longer automatically be assumed."
V. EARLY PROTECTIVE EFFORTS FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY:
RIGHTS IN THE CONTEXT OF WAR
In order to track the foundations for arguments favoring protective
cultural rights of intervention, it is first necessary to survey the histori-
cal development of cultural property law. Although the existing body of
international law addressing protection of cultural property is not fully
evolved, the world community has been developing a protective regime
for cultural property over many centuries. Evidence of concern for the
protection of archeological and cultural property can be found as far
back as a 1425 Papal decree ordering the demolition of buildings which
were likely to cause damage to ancient monuments. 1' ° However, con-
cern evidenced by the growth of numerous multilateral, regional, and
bilateral treaties addressing protection of cultural property, has taken on
a global focus only with the onset of the twentieth century.' These
9 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 689.
9 Blackstone has described property as "that sole and despotic dominion which one man
claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in total exclusion of the right of any
other individual in the universe .... See PAUL GOLDSTEiN, REAL PROPERTY 4-5 (1984) (quot-
ing Lord Blackstone).
98
At the basis of international law lies the notion that a state occupies a defi-
nite part of the surface of the earth, within which it normally exercises, sub-
ject to the limitations imposed by international law, jurisdiction over persons
and things to the exclusion of the jurisdiction of other states. When a state
exercises an authority of this kind over a certain territory it is popularly
said to have "sovereignty" over the territory . . . . Territorial sovereignty
bears an obvious resemblance to ownership in private law . . . [E]arly inter-
national law borrowed the Roman rules for the acquisition of property.
J.L. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 142 (4th ed. 1949).
99 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 689.
100 LYNDEL V. PROTr & PJ. O'KEEFE, LAW AND THE CLTURAL HERITAGE 34 (1984).
101 See, Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 833-35 (discussing the historical
development of the law of war and cultural property in international treaties). The 1972 World
Heritage Convention, supra note 19, is the pinnacle of international cooperation regarding protec-
tion of the world's cultural heritage.
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agreements, which comprise the body of public international law recog-
nizing and addressing cultural property, have their roots in the law of
war." Significantly, none of the existing treaties specifically authorizes
a right of intervention in the national policies of a host state which fails
to provide adequate protection for culturally important property.
In addition to the 1425 Papal order, other protective legislation is
of comparable antiquity, such as a 1462 Papal Bull of Pius H which
protected monuments from the past, and a 1666 Royal Proclamation
which forbade the destruction of ancient monuments and relics of Swe-
den." Other than these few isolated measures, however, most Europe-
an countries did not take steps to protect cultural property until the late
nineteenth century; outside Europe there was no comparable evolutionary
process at all."° As a result, until the late nineteenth century there was
no developed body of international law to protect cultural property from
looting by victors during time of war,0 5 a common practice among
conquering armies who believed "to the victor go the spoils."' 6 Early
signs of an ethical attitude toward a country's cultural property during
war did arise and begin to crystalize into something resembling law in
the eighteenth century when Napoleon took the trouble to "legalize" his
plunder of Italian art by expressly providing for the taking in the trea-
ties imposed on the surrendering Italians."°
For the most part, therefore, the law surrounding the protection of
cultural property has its origins in the law of war as more specifically
developed in the Lieber Code of 1863."8 At the request of the Gener-
al-in-Chief of the Union Armies during the American Civil War, Francis
Lieber, a German emigre professor at Columbia College in New York,
prepared the Instructions for the Governance of Armies of the United
States in the Field, which in articles 34-36 provided for the protection
of cultural property."° Throughout the late nineteenth century, the law
m Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 833.
a Cleere, supra note 47, at v.
'0 Id.
" MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 1, at 14.
06 Jamison K. Shedwill, Is the "Lost Civilization" of the Maya Lost Forever?: The U.S. and
Illicit Trade in Pre-Columbian Artifacts, 23 CAL. W. INT'L LJ. 227, 227 (1992).
107 MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 1, at 14.
' Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 833.
"' Article 34 stated that "[a]s a general rule, the property belonging to .. . establishments
of education . . . whether public schools, universities, academies of learning or observatories,
museums of the fine arts, or of scientific character - such property is not to be considered
public property [available for seizure]." Id. Article 35 stated that "[c]lassical works of art, librar-
ies, scientific collections, or precise instruments, such as astronomical telescopes, as well as hos-
pitals, must be secured against all avoidable injury ...." Id.
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concerning belligerents continued to include provisions for the protection
of cultural property, as evidenced in the 1874 "Declaration of Brussels"
which was promulgated at a conference of fifteen states at the instance
of Russia."'
These international principles forbidding cultural plunder in times of
war were later confirmed and amplified at the Hague conferences of
1899 and 1907 "in what was in effect a Magna Carta [sic] not for man
himself but for his finest achievements, for those objects which mark his
ascendancy, dignity, and purpose.' It is generally thought that these
conventions merely restated earlier treaties concerning cultural property,
were subject to an overriding concession to military necessity, and there-
by provided only limited coverage;" 2 however, they generally recog-
nized that seizure of cultural property by a conquering or occupying
power would no longer be tolerated." 3
Until the 1930s, the protection of cultural property was merely one
topic among the many provisions of the Lieber Code and its progeny,
the main purpose of which was to deal comprehensively with the law of
war and the obligations of belligerents."4 However, during the 1930s
for the first time international interest turned to the preparation of a
convention that dealt solely with the protection of cultural property, yet
still in the context of time of war."' This resulted in the Treaty on the
Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Monuments promul-
gated in 1935 by 21 American nations, also referred to as the Roerich
Pact, which regarded cultural property as neutral territory during time of
war." ' This treaty was superseded in 1939 by the Draft Declaration
and a Draft International Convention for the Protection of Monuments
and Works of Art in Time of War, issued under the auspices of the
League of Nations by the governments of Belgium, Spain, the United
States, Greece, and the Netherlands." 7 The focus of these treaties was
... Article 8 of that Declaration provides that "[e]very seizure, destruction of, or wilful dam-
age to ... historical monuments, or works of art or science, shall be prosecuted by the com-
petent authorities." Id. at 834.
... MERRYMAN & ELSEN, supra note 1, at 41.
12 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 835.
"3 De Jager, supra note 36, at 186.
n4 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 835.
115 Id.
116 Treaty on the Protection of Artistic and Scientific Institutions and Monuments, Apr. 15,
1935, 49 Stat. 3267, 167 L.N.T.S. 279; see also Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note
48, at 835; De Jager, supra note 36, at 185.
. See Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 835 (citing the League of
Nation's Draft Declaration and a Draft International Convention for the Protection of Monuments
and Works of Art in Time of War, 1 U.S. Dep't of State, Documents and State Papers 859
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actually to limit intervention by conquering forces in order to save cul-
tural property.
These efforts by the League of Nations in the late 1930s, however,
were soon overtaken by the events of World War II and the changes in
the technology, tactics, and strategy of warfare. The new concept of
"total war" showed that the rules concerning protection of cultural prop-
erty against belligerent acts had become clearly inadequate."' To elim-
inate this inadequacy, the 1954 Convention on the Protection of Cultural
Property in the Event of Armed Conflict was developed in the post-war
era to firmly establish the importance of a nation's artistic treasures not
only to that nation, but to the entire world."9 The significance of the
Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention was that for the first time,
there was a wide recognition among nations that each holds and admin-
isters its cultural treasures at least in part for the common good of the
entire world." °
VI. THE SEARCH FOR COMMON CULTURAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY'S PROTECTIVE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
A. The Early Works of UNESCO and the Hague 1954
Cultural Property Convention
Since World War II, international law regarding cultural property
has continued to develop both inside and outside the context of war.
The concept of common property was surfaced in many post-war trea-
ties. The primary contributor to the establishment of a body of interna-
tional cultural property law has been UNESCO, whose Constitution
provides that one of its purposes is to "maintain, increase and diffuse
knowledge ... by assuring the conservation and protection of the
world's inheritance of books, works of art and monuments of history
and science, and recommending to the nations concerned the necessary
international conventions.'' The establishment of UNESCO in 1946
and its subsequent efforts led to the signing of the Hague 1954 Cultural
Property Convention," the language of which includes the first ex-
tended definition of cultural property found in international agree-
(1949)).
11 Id.
z Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict, May
14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention].
'o Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 706.
2 Gerard Bolla, Keynote Address, in Symposium on International Art Law, 15 N.Y.U. J.
INT'L L. & PoL. 765, 765 (1983).
'n Id. at 765-66.
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ments." While the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention does not
specifically distinguish between cultural objects of purely local interest
and those of truly international importance, '24 it impliedly creates the
concept of common cultural property in its preamble by emphasizing
that damage to any cultural property is damage to the cultural heritage
of mankind."z Any nationalistic or exclusionary claims to cultural
property based merely on territorial location would seem to fail under
such language of the Convention.
The contracting parties to the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Con-
vention further recognized the damage to cultural property suffered
during World War II and the increasing danger of destruction from the
developing techniques of warfare.'" Although the Hague 1954 Cultural
Property Convention specifically addressed protection in the context of
armed conflict, it was the precursor to international thought that a duty
to protect cultural treasures exists in times of peace as well as in times
of war. 7 This is interpreted to mean that a nation may not secret its
holdings during peacetime, but must provide reasonable access for schol-
' Article 1 provides:
[T]he term 'cultural property' shall cover, irrespective of origin or owner-
ship:
(a) movable or immovable property of great importance to the cultural
heritage of every people, such as monuments of architecture, art, or
history, whether religious or secular;, archaeological sites; groups of
buildings which, as a whole, are of historical or artistic interest; works
of art; manuscripts, books and other objects of artistic, historical or ar-
chaeological interest; as well as scientific collections and important
collections of books or archives or of reproductions of the property
defined above;
(b) buildings whose main and effective purpose is to preserve or ex-
hibit the movable cultural property defined in sub-paragraph (a) such
as museums, large libraries and depositories of archives, and refuges
intended to shelter, in the event of armed conflict, the movable cultur-
al property defined in sub-paragraph (a);
(c) centres containing a large amount of cultural property as defined
in sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), to be known as "centres containing
monuments."
Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 119, art. 1.
124 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 837 n.21.
"z This is set forth by the contracting parties who were "convinced that damage to cultural
property belonging to any people whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all man-
kind, since each people makes its contribution to the culture of the world." Hague 1954 Cultural
Property Convention, supra note 119, pmbl. (emphasis added).
" The preamble states "that cultural property ha[d] suffered grave damage during recent
armed conflicts and that, by reason of the developments in the technique of warfare, it is in in-
creasing danger of destruction." Id.
127 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 706.
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ars and for the general public, as part of its responsibilities to preserve
and protect cultural property located within its territory."
The Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention Convention sought
to protect property of great importance to the cultural heritage of all
people by recognizing that nations have a duty in the administration of
their cultural treasures not only to their own nationals, but to mankind
as well.29 The treaty has been described as international legislation
that supports the concept of "cultural internationalism,""' or in other
words, a common heritage of all mankind. Such treaty language making
reference to cultural property held for "a common good," gives force to
the idea that humanity is the true party in interest, independent of na-
tions and international arrangements.' Further, it recognizes that cul-
tural property has importance to the world as a whole, justifying special
international and domestic legal measures to ensure its preservation.'
Under this line of thought, such special legal measures can be interpret-
ed and expanded to include rights of protective intervention for the
common good of all mankind.
According to former UNESCO Assistant Director-General for Com-
munications, Gerard Bolla, the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention
is "sometimes called the 'Red Cross' of monuments and museums in
time of war."' This description is based on its somewhat successful
application in a number of armed conflicts; for example, in the Middle
East conflicts between India and Pakistan, and between Iraq and
Iran. 34 In view of its limited success in the past, it might have been
applied in the Gulf War of 1990-91, as well as the Croatian-Serbian
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia.3 The ineffectiveness of the Hague
128 id.
129 Id.
"3 Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 842 (indicating that the Hague 1954
Cultural Property Convention "is a piece of international legislation that exemplifies an influential
way of thinking about cultural property, which I will call 'cultural internationalism[.]').
I d. at 842 n.37.
2 Id. at 841.
.3. Bolla, supra note 121, at 766 (indicating that in 1983, seventy-one states were parties to
Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention).
23 Id. at 766.
'ss See supra part II. Shortly after the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq, UNESCO sent letters to
both governments reminding them of their responsibilities as parties to the Hague 1954 Cultural
Property Convention. Arlene K. Fleming, Securing Sites in Time of War, ARCHAEOLOGY, May-
June 1991, at 43.
Further, the intentional shelling of historic sites bearing the bright blue and white Hague
Convention flag in Croatia was "a clear violation of the Hague Convention ... which was
ratified by UNESCO in 1954 and signed by Yugoslavia in 1955," according to Croatian authori-
ties who further indicated that the Serbian army "has transformed monuments into enemies, for-
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1954 Cultural Property Convention in these situations can be attributed
to its failure to provide rights of protective intervention to states not
parties to the conflict. While non-warring states have an interest in the
world's common cultural property being destroyed by the warring states,
the warring states have either refused to recognize their protective duties
under the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention, or are not even
members to the treaty. The enforcement mechanisms of the treaty are
suspect given this weakness in its ability to ultimately protect the com-
mon heritage of mankind.
36
The Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention does provide for the
establishment of special refuges and protective centres during armed
conflict for immovable cultural property of "very great importance," and
specifically states that the guarding of this cultural property by armed
custodians is not considered use of armed force for military
purposes. The Convention also provides for transport of cultural
property to another territory under the international supervision of "Pro-
tecting Powers;" that is representatives, appointed by each contracting
party, who will act on behalf of the parties involved in the conflict to
protect any cultural property removed to a temporary refuge.3 3 There-
fore, the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention does make orches-
trations at establishing a protective cultural property regime under the
joint efforts of all signatories during times of war, including conflicts
not of an international character.'39 It also provides that UNESCO may
offer its services to the parties in conflict."4 The roots for protective
intervention can be found in these special provisions permitting armed
guards, protective removal, and UNESCO interference.
But if the parties involved in conflict are not themselves contracting
parties to the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention, it leaves other
interested states without effective recourse against the destructive effects
of warfare on their common cultural property. Without any treaty-sanc-
tioned ability for the rest of the world to intervene, the language of the
Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention remains idealistic dialogue -
an example of good international intent among the contracting parties,
getting that palaces, museums, and churches belong to everyone." Crisis in Croatia, ARCHAEOLO-
GY, Mar.-April 1992, at 21.
16 Although the United States never ratified the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention, it
was a signatory. In addition, among the 77 nations who have ratified the Hague 1954 Cultural
Property Convention are several of the countries involved in the Gulf War Egypt, France, Iraq,
Italy, Kuwait, Morocco, Saudi Arabia, Syria, and Turkey. Fleming, supra note 135, at 43.
,3 Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention, supra note 119, arts. 4, 8(1).
"' Id. arts. 1, 2, 11.
139 Id. art. 19.
I' Id. art. 19(3).
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but without effective results or remedies when put to the test in the
reality of modem warfare. In this respect, it appears little more effective
than its predecessor agreements developed by the League of Nations,"'
as proven by the destructive battles of the past two years in Eastern
Europe and Iraq. If the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention were
truly the Red Cross of monuments, it should include similar rights of
protective entry as the Red Cross enjoys in its humanitarian missions.
B. Regional Cultural Property Law
1. Protecting Cultural Property in Europe
Shortly after the development of the Hague 1954 Cultural Property
Convention by UNESCO, the European Community (E.C.) took steps to
memorialize this belief in a common heritage, drafting the European
Cultural Convention to "safeguard and to encourage the development
of... national contribution to the common cultural heritage of Eu-
rope."'42 This was one of the first treaties to address the problem of
protecting common culture in times other than during war. While it does
not contain a detailed definition of cultural property as in the Hague
1954 Cultural Property Convention, it does specifically recognize a
"common cultural heritage of Europe."' 43 The meaning of this term,
however, can be derived from the preamble of the Convention where the
Governments of the signatory parties "resolved to conclude a general
European Cultural Convention designed to foster among the nationals of
all Members . . . the study of the languages, history and civilisation of
the others and of the civilisation which is common to them all."'"
Not only did the convention recognize the concept of common
cultural property, it also recognized a right of access to such property
by stating that each contracting party shall "regard the objects of Euro-
pean cultural value placed under its control as integral parts of the com-
mon cultural heritage of Europe, shall take appropriate measures to
safeguard them and shall ensure reasonable access thereto."'4 Can
this clause allowing "reasonable access" be interpreted to permit inter-
vention without permission if one European state is not protecting cul-
tural property considered of importance to the rest of Europe? The con-
cept of intervention appears to find roots in such permissive language.
"' See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
'~ European Cultural Convention, Dec. 19, 1954, art. , 218 U.N.T.S. 139 (1955).
143 See id.
'" Id. pmbl. (emphasis added).
"' Id. art. 5 (emphasis added).
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The E.C. continued its efforts in advancing the notion of a common
European culture with several later treaties which recognized a "common
heritage,"'" a "European cultural heritage,"'" and "a common heri-
tage of all Europeans."'" The Council of Europe's 1985 Convention
on Offences Relating to Cultural Property further focused attention on
the problem and on the concept of common cultural heritage of Eu-
rope.1
49
The 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heri-
tage of Europe appears to be one of the first, and possibly only, interna-
tional agreements that provides permission to public authorities within
each state "to require the owner of a protected property to carry out
work or to carry out such work itself if the owner fails to do so," and
"allows compulsory purchase of a protected property."'5 t One begins to
see a breakdown in traditional property concepts when dealing with
cultural property. The treaty is recognizing a right of intervention on a
domestic level in private property rights for the benefit of preserving
cultural property of significance to the entire state. This concept is ex-
"4 European Convention on the Protection of the Archaeological Heritage, May 6, 1969,
pmbl., Europ. T.S. No. 66, reprinted in 8 I.L.M. 736 (1969). The Convention considers "archaeo-
logical objects" to be "all remains and objects, or any other traces of human existence, which
bear witness to epochs and civilizations for which excavations or discoveries are the main source
or one of the main sources of scientific information." Id. at 737. It does not specifically define
"common heritage", however, or clarify if all such objects are part of the common heritage dis-
cussed in the preamble.
"' European Convention on Offences Relating to Cultural Property, June 23, 1985, pmbl., 25
I.L.M. 44 (1986). Appendix II of the Convention provides a detailed description of the cultural
property to which the Convention applies. Id. at 53.
" Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, Oct. 3, 1985,
pmbl., 25 I.L.M. 380. Article 1 of the Convention defines "architectural heritage" to include:
1. Monuments: all buildings and structures of conspicuous historical, archaeo-
logical, artistic, scientific, social or technical interest, including their fixtures
and fittings;
2. Groups of buildings: homogeneous groups of urban or rural buildings con-
spicuous for their historical, archaeological, artistic, scientific, social or tech-
nical interest which are sufficiently coherent to form topographically defin-
able units;
3. Sites: the combined works of man and nature, being areas which are
partially built upon and sufficiently distinctive and homogeneous to be topo-
graphically definable and are of conspicuous historical, archaeological, artis-
tic, scientific, social or technical interest.
Id. at 381.
149 Nafziger, International Penal Aspects, supra note 21, at 835 (referencing the Draft Con-
vention on Offenses Relating to Cultural Property which has since been adopted as the final
1985 Convention).
"~ Convention for the Protection of the Architectural Heritage of Europe, supra note 148, at
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pandable to the international arena as well, supporting a right of inter-
vention on an international level in the territorial property rights of a
state for the benefit of preserving cultural property of significance to the
entire world.
Among national legal schemes regarding cultural property law with-
in this European framework, Italy has the "most ambitious protection
regime in the world."'' It is an example of a state with a strong com-
mitment to concepts of private property, yet which is prepared to make
exceptions for the sake of the cultural heritage.' Its 1939 Law on the
Protection of Objects of Artistic and Historic Interest, which still is in
force,'53 actually preceded the European movement on protection of
cultural property. The Italian Government identifies all objects of interest
and significance to the nation, whether in private or public hands, and
the Ministry of National Education provides directly for necessary con-
servation measures on all property.'54 While private owners are expect-
ed to reimburse the state for conservation measures undertaken, if the
owner cannot afford the upkeep, the burden is assumed by the state -
which also has the right to acquire the work after duly compensating the
owner. 155 In this manner, the state assumes the role of guardian over
endangered objects, and can specify protectionary measures for cultural
property.
156
However, like the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the Archi-
tectural Heritage of Europe the Italian scheme merely permits domestic
intervention without recognizing an international right of protection of
privately owned cultural property. Nations claiming a common interest
in any Italian cultural property and advocating improved preservation ef-
forts, cannot find express support for their claims in the Italian or Euro-
pean legal regime. The laws do not provide for effective safeguards or
protective rights by those outside the domestic legal jurisdiction. But
this domestically recognized right of intervention in private property
rights is transferrable to an international level. The norms are in exis-
tence; they need only be advocated and emphasized by an appropriate
international body and its member states so as to rise to the level of
international custom and law.
On the other hand, while the Italian approach strengthens an argu-
1 Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 709.
252 PROTT & O'KEEMF, supra note 13, at 188.
153 id.
" Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 708.
155 id.
" James A.R. Nafziger, Comments on the Relevance of Law and Culture to Cultural Proper-
ty Law, 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 323, 332 (1983).
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ment for departure from traditional property norms, some have suggested
its actual effect is not as desirable as one might think. Instead of im-
proving the preservation environment, the laws can cause local farmers
who discover archeological sites on their property to quickly plunder
and sell artifacts without notifying authorities - primarily out of fear
that their farms will be taken for inadequate compensation, or out of
emotional desires to maintain ownership of their family homesteads.'57
The same holds true on an international level, where countries will
refuse to recognize and identify important cultural sites out of fear of
international exposure and possible intervention. The search for common
cultural property laws involves a difficult balancing of these interests.
2. Protecting Cultural Property in Latin America
During the 1970's, the American states began to recognize and
address their common cultural heritage. The previously mentioned Con-
vention of San Salvador was a response to the "continuous looting and
plundering of the native cultural heritage suffered by the countries of the
hemisphere."'58 With particular concern for the Latin American coun-
tries, the Convention recognized that "there is a basic obligation to
transmit to coming generations the legacy of their cultural heritage."""
It should be noted, however, that although the Convention seeming-
ly recognizes common American cultural property, it approaches pro-
tection from a purely domestic perspective. Despite liberal wording
favoring "a framework of the soundest inter-American cooperation ' ' "6
"' Interview with Dr. David Brose, Chief Curator of Archaeology, Cleveland Museum of
Natural History, in Cleveland, Ohio (Nov. 11, 1992).
'u Convention of San Salvador, supra note 20, pmbl. See also supra note 11.
Id. art. 1. The Convention gives a definition of cultural property in article 2:
a. Monuments, objects, fragments of ruined buildings, and archeological
materials belonging to American cultures existing prior to contact with Euro-
pean culture, as well as remains of human beings, fauna, and flora related
to such cultures;
b. Monuments, buildings, objects of an artistic, utilitarian, and ethnological
nature, whole or in fragments, from the colonial era and the Nineteenth
Century;
c. Libraries and archives; incunabula and manuscripts; books and other publi-
cations, iconographies, maps and documents published before 1850;
d. All objects originating after 1850 that the States Parties have recorded as
cultural property, provided that they have given notice of such registration to
the other parties to the treaty;
e. All cultural property that any of the States Parties specifically declares to
be included within the scope of this convention.
Id. art. 2.
6 Id. pmbl.
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it expressly provides that regulations on ownership, transfer, and thus
protection of cultural property "shall be governed by domestic legisla-
tion," thereby recognizing the ultimately exclusive jurisdiction of
domestic law over protective efforts. At the same time, its idyllic pream-
ble provisions regarding the "Heritage of the American Countries" is
contradicted by the express wording of the treaty body which entitles
each state to recognize property found or created in its territory as the
"cultural heritage of each state," and makes no mention of common
rights of ownership by fellow American states.62 The ineffectiveness
of such international law is evidenced by the previously discussed Ma-
yan cultural property destruction in El Salvador, which proved detrimen-
tal to all other American states of Mayan cultural ancestry.'63
Some relief is provided in Article 17 of the Convention which
charges the General Secretariat of the Organization of American States
with ensuring the enforcement and effectiveness of this Convention, and
with arranging technical cooperation requested by the States."6 Theo-
retically, an argument for intervention by the General Secretariat can be
found in this language, which is very broad and unlimiting on its face.
If support for more effective rights of protective intervention are needed,
the American States need only invoke this language, found in existing
agreements, as foundational legal support, and develop their common
ownership arguments accordingly.
C. UNESCO and Multilateral Cultural Property Treaties
In addition to regional agreements, the development of multilateral
cultural property treaties was also prevalent in the 1970s. In fact, be-
tween 1956 and 1980, the UNESCO General Conference adopted ten
Recommendations and two international Conventions covering practically
all aspects of the identification, protection, preservation, restoration, and
presentation of movable and immovable cultural heritage. 65 Unfortu-
nately from a common culture perspective, some of these have evi-
denced more of a movement away from the common property precepts
that sprouted from the Hague 1954 Cultural Property Convention and
the European Conventions, and more toward what has been called the
"repatriation movement" in response to significant "de-contextualiztion"
161 Id. art. 7.
.6. Id. art. 5.
3 See supra note 18 and accompanying text.
" Convention of San Salvador, supra note 20, art. 17(a).
x' See Bolla, supra note 121, at 766-67 nn. 4-12 (providing a partial listing of these rec-
ommendations and treaties).
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of artifacts from lessor developed countries.'66
While UNESCO advocates that the full enjoyment of common
heritage is an indispensable condition for self-realization of all peo-
ples,67 the focus of many of their recommendations and agreements is
on the state's rights, as opposed to those who might claim common
property rights on a cultural basis. The 1970 Convention on the Illicit
Movement of Art Treasures, although not specifically applicable to im-
moveable cultural property, does recognize that "the protection of cultur-
al heritage can be effective only if organized both nationally and inter-
nationally among States working in close co-operation."'68 At the same
time, however, it upholds the priority of each State's rights in control-
ling protection efforts over cultural property found within the national
territory of each state.'69
Herein lies the major dilemma and obstacle to resolving the ques-
tion of who should control this common property. Of concern is the
" "Repatriation" refers to the return of cultural objects to their nations of origin, to the
nations whose people now include the cultural descendants of those who made the objects, or to
the nations whose territory now includes the original site from which the objects were removed.
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 845.
"De-contextualization" occurs, for example, when "[a] Mayan stele tom from an undevel-
oped, undocumented site in the jungle of Belize and smuggled to Switzerland to be sold be-
comes anonymous. Both it and the site have been deprived of valuable archaeological and ethno-
logical information." Id. at 843.
Preventing the removal of artifacts and archeological items from their site of original dis-
covery is a major concern among archaeologists and historians since:
[A]n Indian artifact or a historic object that has been stripped of its historic
or scientific significance by having been taken out of its original context
without an adequate record . . . is an object of interest or curiosity for
itself only, not for what it might have told us about the culture from which
it came.
Hester A. Davis, The Crisis in American Archeology, 175 SCIENCE 267, 272 (1972).
67 See De Jager, supra note 36, at 190 (referring to comments made by UNESCO Commit-
tee of Experts to Study the Question of the Restitution of Works of Art, Mar. 29-Apr. 2, 1976,
Final Report 4).
66 UNESCO Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Ex-
port and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property, Nov. 14, 1970, 823 U.N.T.S. 231 (empha-
sis added).
"9 Article 4 of the Convention provides that:
The States Parties to this Convention recognize that for the purpose of the
Convention property which belongs to the following categories forms part of
the cultural heritage of each State: (a) Cultural property created by the indi-
vidual or collective genius of nationals of the State concerned, and cultural
property of importance to the State concerned created within the territory of
that State by foreign nationals . . . (b) cultural property found within the
national territory.
Id. art. 4.
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Convention's definition of cultural property which provides that host
states alone determine which property is important to the cultural heri-
tage. '7 The Convention goes on to give an extensive, yet not exhaus-
tive, list of categories of objects that are covered by the treaty.' The
generality in the category descriptions allows each state to subjectively
specify the content and scope of which cultural objects are to be subject
to the Convention's protective terms." As a result, there is great di-
versity among the various national legal systems in establishing their re-
spective criteria for determining which objects, if any, are to be
protected."
While this theory might recognize the unique contribution of each
state to the cultural heritage of mankind, granting each state the
right to subjectively specify the scope and content of cultural property
includes the right to exclude property from protection that others outside
the state might find more culturally valuable. It also permits an exclu-
sion from protection on grounds of domestic budget concerns - i.e. if
not designated, no funds need be allocated to that artifact for protective
efforts. A nationally controlled, self-designated cultural property frame-
work cannot truly promote common outside cultural property interests.
Since UNESCO 1970, "protection" of cultural property has in reality
become a euphemism for "retention" or "protection against removal"
with little regard for the Convention's other language promoting a com-
mon cultural property concept.7" Once again, the foundational support
for common protective efforts, including rights of intervention, are found
in the treaty's noble ambitions laid down in its introduction. Yet the
treaty's text defaults to traditional territorial concepts for its protective
legal framework, a framework susceptible to the situs government's self-
serving motivations, domestic political persuasion, and internal economic
conditions.
An approach more supportive of common control of common prop-
erty is found in the 1972 Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at
a National Level, of the Cultural and Natural Heritage. This document
emphasizes that "every country in whose territory there are components
of the cultural and natural heritage has an obligation to safeguard this
'"' The Convention defines cultural property as "property which, on religious or secular
grounds, is specifically designated by each State as being of importance for archaeology, prehis-
tory, history, [literature, art, or science]. ... Id. art. 1 (emphasis added).
... Id. art. l(a)-k).
" Nieci6wna, supra note 6, at 249.
173 Id.
'' Id. at 250.
37s Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 844.
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part of mankind's heritage and to ensure that it is handed down to
future generations.' 76 A significant weakness, however, in the Recom-
mendation is that there is no express definition of what comprises the
specifically identifiable "components" of mankind's heritage. The Rec-
ommendation does state, as a general principle, that
[t]he cultural and natural heritage represents wealth ... which impo-
se[s] responsibilities on the States in whose territory it is situated, both
vis-a-vis their own nationals and vis-d-vis the international community
as a whole, [and that] [t]he cultural or natural heritage should be con-
sidered in its entirety as a homogeneous whole comprising not only
works of great intrinsic value, but also more modest items that have
with the passage of time, acquired cultural or natural value."
While the Recommendation also emphasizes a territorial approach,
the seeds of support for internationally initiated protective efforts can be
found in this language. If it is recognized that host States have responsi-
bilities to the international community for cultural heritage located with-
in their borders, then the international community must have rights and
remedies for the host State's breach of that duty and responsibility.
Rights of entry to investigate, diagnose, and cure must be included in
those recognized remedies or the UNESCO language remains an ineffec-
tive legal fiction.
The most extensive international legislation concerning preservation
of mankind's common cultural heritage occurred in 1972 with the sign-
ing of the UNESCO World Heritage Convention.' Little discussion of
this agreement is mentioned, however, in most articles analyzing cultural
property problems. The treaty recognizes "parts of the cultural or natural
heritage are of outstanding interest and therefore need to be preserved as
part of the world heritage of mankind as a whole."' 79 However, it too
fails to provide special provisions for international intervention and
protection of common cultural heritage, instead fully respecting the
sovereignty of the States on whose territory the cultural and natural
heritage is situated, without prejudicing property rights provided by na-
tional legislation. 8
176 UNESCO Recommendation Concerning the Protection, at a National Level, of the Cultural
and Natural Heritage, UNESCO Doc. 17 C/107 (Nov. 15, 1972), pmbl., reprinted in 11 I.L.M.
1367 (1972) (emphasis added).
m Id. at 1368 (emphasis added).
78 World Heritage Convention, supra note 19.
,I Id. pmbl.
,8 Id. art. 6. Article 6 indicates:
1. Whilst fully respecting the sovereignty of the States on whose territory
468 [Vol. 26:435
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The treaty does provide for the creation and maintenance of a
World Heritage List and a List of World Heritage in Danger.'' Yet
the Convention relies on each State that is a party to submit to the
World Heritage Committee an inventory of property forming part of
what it subjectively considers to be cultural and natural heritage, situated
in its territory, with an outstanding universal value to the formation of
the cultural heritage and natural heritage.' The Convention has an ex-
press stipulation that "inclusion of a property in the World Heritage List
requires the consent of the State concerned."''
The World Heritage Convention established The World Heritage
Committee to consider requests from any State Party for international
assistance for property of universal value located within its territory,
184
and indicates what forms of assistance will be granted."' While these
the cultural and natural heritage . . is situated, and without prejudice to
property rights provided by national legislation, the States Parties to this
Convention recognize that such heritage constitutes a world heritage for
whose protection it is the duty of the international community as a whole to
co-operate.
2. The States Parties undertake . . . to give their help in the identification,
protection, conservation and preservation of the cultural and natural heri-
tage . . . if the States on whose territory it is situated so request.
I& (emphasis added).
"I Id. art. 11.
182 Id.
10 Id. arts. 11(l)-(4).
I" Id. arts. 19, 21. Article 19 provides that "[a]ny State Party to this Convention may re-
quest international assistance for property forming part of the cultural or natural heritage of out-
standing universal value situated within its territory." Id. art. 19 (emphasis added). While, article
21(1) provides:
The World Heritage Committee shall define the procedure by which
requests to it for international assistance shall be considered and shall
specify the content of the request, which should define the operation
contemplated, the work that is necessary, the expected cost thereof, the
degree of urgency and the reasons why the resources of the State
requesting assistance do not allow it to meet all the expenses.
Id. art. 21.
' Id. art. 22. Article 22 provides:
Assistance granted by the World Heritage Committee may take the following
forms:
(a) studies concerning the artistic, scientific and technical problems
raised by the protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of
the cultural and natural heritage, as defined in paragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article 11 of this Convention;
(b) provision of experts, technicians and skilled labour to ensure that
the approved work is correctly carried out;
(c) training of staff and specialists at all levels in the field of identi-
fication, protection, conservation, presentation and rehabilitation of the
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are applaudable programs, again they are restricted to impetus from the
territorial state. Despite the treaty's regard for the world's heritage, the
world receives no rights of protection; only States have such rights. The
assistance provisions need to be expanded to include a right for any
State, not just the one where the cultural heritage is situated, to invoke
the help and funding of this UNESCO Committee. The assistance grant-
ed by the Committee under the convention cannot be truly protective of
common property rights without such recognized intervention provisions.
Further, while funding for properties can be provided by the Inter-
national Fund for the Promotion of Culture of UNESCO, established in
1977,"86 or the World Heritage Fund established under Article 15 by
the signatories to the World Heritage Convention,"8 difficulties in fi-
nancing projects can arise under the existing treaty framework. Any
cultural and natural heritage;
(d) supply of equipment which the State concerned does not possess
or is not in a position to acquire;
(e) low-interest or interest-free loans which might be repayable on a
long-term basis;
(f) the granting, in exceptional cases and for special reasons, of non-
repayable subsidies.
Id.
' The Fund's main sources are contributions by UNESCO member states, private institu-
tions, and investment income. Although the fund did contribute to 198 projects in 74 countries
from 1977 to 1985, the funding situation remains difficult. For example, the United States is one
of four members not a signatory to the United Nations Law of the Sea Convention. As a result,
it withheld its pro rata share of the costs of the U.N. budget for funding the Law of the Sea
Preparatory Commission, a U.N. body that contributes to the UNESCO fund for archaeological
purposes. Anastasia Strati, Deep Seabed Cultural Property and the Common Heritage of Mankind,
40 INT'L & COMP. L. Q. 859, 882 n.59 (1991).
'87 Article 15 provides:
1. A Fund for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage of
Outstanding Universal Value, called "the World Heritage Fund," is hereby
established ....
3. The resources of the Fund shall consist of:
(a) compulsory and voluntary contributions made by the States Parties
to this Convention,
(b) contributions, gifts or bequests which may be made by: (i) other
states; (ii) the UNESCO, other organizations of the United Nations
system, particularly the United Nations Development Programme or
other intergovernmental organizations; (iii) public or private bodies or
individuals;
(c) any interest due on resources of the Fund;
(d) funds raised by collections and receipts from events organized for
the benefit of the Fund; and
(e) all other resources authorized by the Fund's regulations, as drawn
up by the World Heritage Committee . ...
World Heritage Convention, supra note 19, art. 15.
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funding sources remain limited and unpredictable since contributions of
Member States can be, and are, withheld for political reasons.' 8
Therefore, common culture under the World Heritage Convention
remains dependent upon the willingness and ability of the host state to
provide protection; placing the territorial control of the nation-state
above any worldwide or regional interest in the cultural heritage of
mankind. This has, and will continue to create situations where domestic
concerns take priority over common cultural property preservation,
sometimes to the detriment of the world community's interests. A right
of intervention could correct this international legal void by allowing
protective cultural intercession in the event improved preservation is
warranted.
VII. RIGHTS OF INTERVENTION FOR COMMON CULTURAL HERITAGE
AND THE LAW OF THE SEA
Probably the clearest example of exceptional treatment of common
cultural heritage is found in the context of the United Nations Conven-
tion on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).5 9 The Convention seeks to
develop the principle that "[t]he seabed and ocean floor, and the subsoil
thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction ... as well as the
resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind."'' The
Convention further provides that "exploration of that area and the ex-
ploitation of those resources must be carried out for the benefit of all
mankind."''" The "common heritage of mankind" in the UNCLOS con-
s Article 16(1) of the World Heritage Convention provides that "the States Parties to this
convention undertake to pay regularly, every two years, to the World Heritage Fund, contribu-
tions, the amount of which, in the form of a uniform percentage applicable to all States, shall
be determined by the General Assembly of States Parties to the Convention . Id. art.
16(1).
Unfortunately, more resourceful nations can opt out of the critical funding provisions of the
World Heritage Convention, as in the case of the United States which ratified the treaty "subject
to a declaration under Article 16(2) that the United States shall not be bound by the provisions
of Article 16(1)." Id.
Article 16(2) is a major weakness to the Convention's ability to properly fund protective
efforts since it provides that "each State . . .may declare, at the time of the deposit of its
instruments of ratification, acceptance or accession, that it shall not be bound by the provisions
of paragraph 1 of this Article." Id. art. 16(2). This is precisely what the United States has done.
9 U.N. Doc. AJCONF.62/122 (1982) as amended in U.N. Doc. AJCONF.62/122/Corr. 3
(1982) and A/CONF.62/122 Corr. 8 (1982), reprinted in 21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982) [hereinafter
UNCLOS].
" Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-Bed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil
Thereof, Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, G.A. Res. 4355, 25 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No.
28), at 24, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970).
" UNCLOS, supra note 189, pmbl.
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text is assumed, by some scholars, to consist of the essential charac-
teristic that objects covered by this principle cannot be appropriated by a
person or a state, and that all states participate in the stewardship of
these resources. 9 The Convention grants exclusive use of territorial
waters to coastal states for the twelve-mile territorial zone, 93 and pref-
erential use of the twenty-four-mile contiguous zones.'94 Arguably, it
does not exclude others from the twenty-four-mile zone and beyond for
purposes of scientific research, provided the intruders do not remove ob-
jects, or infringe on the coastal states "customs, fiscal, immigration, or
sanitary laws and regulations within its territory or territorial sea.''
While the term "common heritage" originally concerned the mineral
resources of the deep seabed, some authors have stated that the concept
was worth using equally with regard to art and archaeology.'96 Further,
since all of the previously discussed cultural property conventions and
instruments apply a territorial-jurisdictional approach with respect to law-
making and enforcement over archaeological resources, drafters of
UNCLOS concluded that the existing cultural instruments could not
"9 De Jager, supra note 36, at 189.
'93 "Every State has the right to establish the breadth of its territorial sea up to a limit not
exceeding 12 nautical miles measured from baselines determined in accordance with this Conven-
tion." UNCLOS, supra note 189, art. 3.
94 "The sovereignty of a coastal State extends, beyond its land territory and internal wa-
ters ... to an adjacent belt of sea, described as the territorial sea." Id. art. 2(1).
In the zone contiguous to a state's territorial sea, or its contiguous zone, the coastal State
may exercise the control necessary to "1. (a) prevent infringement of its customs, fiscal, immi-
gration or sanitary laws and regulations ... [and]
(b) punish infringement of the above laws and regulations ....
2. The contiguous zone may not extend beyond 24 nautical miles from the baselines from which
the breadth of the territorial sea is measured." Id. art. 33.
"g Id. art. 33. In addition, article 303 entitled "Archaeological and Historical Objects Found
at Sea" provides:
1. States have the duty to protect objects of an archaeological and
historical nature found at sea and shall co-operate for this purpose.
2. In order to control traffic in such objects, the coastal State may, in
applying article 33, presume that their removal from the sea-bed in
the zone referred to in that article without its approval would result in
an infringement within its territory or territorial sea of the laws and
regulations referred to in that article.
3. Nothing in this article affects the rights of identifiable owners, the
law of salvage or other rules of admiralty, or laws and practices with
respect to cultural exchanges.
4. This article is without prejudice to other international agreements
and rules of international law regarding the protection of objects of an
archaeological and historical nature.
Id. art. 303.
6 De Jager, supra note 36, at 189.
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provide a satisfactory basis for protecting deep seabed cultural proper-
ty.' Therefore, the 1982 UNCLOS specifically provided for archaeo-
logical and historical objects under the sea'98 in its desire to fully pro-
tect the common heritage of mankind.
International practice generally has granted archaeological sites
under the water universal or common ownership properties not granted
sites found on land. In the early 1970's, both Greece and Turkey sub-
mitted proposals to the United Nations seabed working sub-committee
that provided for the protection of the archaeological and historical
treasures of the deep seabed as the common heritage of mankind."9
The proposals further recognized the Seabed Authority as the competent
international organ to administer and protect deep seabed archaeological
treasures.' The goal was to empower the Seabed Authority estab-
lished under UNCLOS as the custodian of archaeological treasures for
the benefit of all mankind.2°' This approach would preserve rightful
interests of States of origin of a sunken vessel and/or treasures on
board. As custodian, it would protect shared interests of all States since
there are considerable difficulties in identifying the true State of origin
when the same culture might have been shared in the past by what is
now several countries.' While the Seabed Authority unfortunately was
never established as such a custodian, Article 149 of UNCLOS did
establish that all archaeological objects found beyond the twelve-mile
territorial zones were part of the heritage of all mankind. 3 Therefore,
since 1982, UNCLOS has served as the governing body of law re-
garding underwater archeological remains, treating those found beyond
the twelve-mile zone as common property of mankind deserving of
international access for identification and research purposes.
Some legal authorities have recommended a multiple jurisdiction
' Strati, supra note 186, at 867-68.
Id. at 865 (referencing UNCLOS article 303).
'9 Id. at 874-75.
w Id.
2, Id.
z' Id. at 875-76.
Article 149 provides:
[A]II objects of an archaeological and historical nature found in the Area
[beyond the twelve-mile national jurisdiction of coastal states] shall be pre-
served or disposed of for the benefit of mankind as a whole, particular
regard being paid to the preferential rights of the States or Country of ori-
gin, or the State of cultural origin, or the State of historical and archaeolog-
ical origin.
UNCLOS, supra note 189, art. 149 (emphasis added). For a discussion of these terms, see Strati,
supra note 186.
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approach to underwater resources, including archeological fimds.' This
involves replacing the principle of "freedom of the seas" with a princi-
ple of "common heritage of mankind" in order to preserve the greater
part of the ocean, including any archaeological sites, as a commons
accessible to the international community. 5 Under this scenario, the
commons of the high seas would not be open to the whims of the users
and exploiters, but would be internationally administered for the com-
mon good.' This would hold true for any archaeological sites located
in the twenty-four-mile contiguous zones. Although the coastal state re-
tains primary control over its contiguous zone, an important corollary is
that it is not exclusive control. As expressed in the Fisheries Jurisdiction
Cases, 7 the notion that one state may have a preferential right to the
sea in its contiguous territorial zone implies the existence of other legal
rights in respect of which that preference can operate - i.e. one cannot
have preferred rights unless others also have some rights to the same
property. 8
In this regard, characterizing one state's rights as preferential im-
plies a priority of rights, but cannot imply the extinction of the concur-
rent rights of other states.2" Other states may still gain access to that
property under international law. Therefore, multiple states can have
jurisdiction and recognized rights over the same property located within
a specific maritime territory.
A similar concept could be applied above ground as well, subordi-
nating territorial rights of states to an overriding international law of
protection and intervention for scientific purposes, effectively adminis-
tered by an international authority."' As with the law of the sea where
"limits to national jurisdictions are essential,"2 ' effective preservation
' L.F.E. Goldie, A Note on Some Diverse Meanings of "The Common Heritage of Man-
kind," 10 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & CoM. 69, 87 (1983) (referencing Ambassador Arvid Pardo's
remarks on the law of the sea negotiations). Ambassador Pardo is "regarded as the progenitor of
this phrase [common cultural heritage] in the law of the sea context," advocating "a completely
new blueprint for the law governing mankind's use of the resources of the high seas beyond the
limits of the resource jurisdiction of any state." Id.
... Id. at 86.
m6 Id.
' Fisheries Jurisdiction (U.K. v. Iceland), Merits Judgment, 1974 I.CJ. 3; Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), cited in Strati, supra note 186, at 883 n.64.
Strati, supra note 186, at 883.
209 Id.
210 Likewise, this could also involve the establishment of an international trust with properties
deemed to be of significance to groups or the world placed under the protection and control of
an international, yet nongovernmental, body acting as custodian and trustee, with rights of in-
tervention into territorial sovereignty of host states in order to implement those rights of protec-
tion.
2" Charles F. Doran, Multiple Jurisdiction - Will It Save or Destroy the Oceans?, 7 VAND.
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of the non-aquatic common heritage requires similar limitations. Limita-
tions placed on freedom of the high seas to protect archeological re-
mains have been considered only slight intrusions on the sovereignty of
the high seas since the benefits of protecting the world heritage more
than offset the intrusion. 2
Further, since inadequate protection by a host state of common
cultural property has effects on the rights of outsiders who share an
interest in that property, extraterritorial jurisdiction can and should be
justified to intervene in the host state's domestic policies and practic-
es.23 The "effects rule" of long arm jurisdiction has been given as a
basis for a state's extraterritorial jurisdiction over marine archeological
sites. 4 Such an effects argument could be used in the context of land-
based common cultural property - i.e. the failure to preserve common
culture has an effect on property rights of outside states, who can then
claim jurisdiction over preservation efforts. The ideal scenario, however,
would be for that jurisdiction to be exercised on behalf of interested
national governments or groups by an impartial international administra-
tor.
VI. CONCLUSION
Since the world has long recognized that cultural property compris-
ing mankind's common cultural heritage should not be the province of
J. TRANSNAT'L L. 631, 659 (1974). Wolfgang Friedman has proposed that "international law
recognize a new jurisdictional zone, distinct from the territorial waters zone and of much greater
expanse, within which a coastal state would have control solely over pollution and conservation
matters." Id. at 660. A similar multijurisdictional approach can be suggested for territorial land
zones of cultural significance with the host state responsible for some ministerial duties, but with
ultimate control and rights vested in an international organization, or in every state with recourse
to such an international body in the event of local dereliction of duties.
2' John P. Fry, The Treasure Below: Jurisdiction Over Salving Operations in International
Waters, 88 COLum. L. REv. 863, 881 (1988).
213 Id. at 873.
21 Fry discusses a U. S. state district court's issuance of a temporary restraining order pre-
venting anyone having notice of the injunction from interfering with one salvage company's
efforts to salve the Titanic, a vessel lying in international waters, relying on the international
maritime rule protecting "the right of first salvor." "The court reasoned that the presence of
certain pieces of the vessel brought into the jurisdiction was sufficient to give constructive pos-
session of the wreck, so that for the purpose of in rem jurisdiction the res was within the terri-
tory of the court." Id. at 873-74
Fry reasons that assertion of extraterritorial jurisdiction in this case falls under the "effects"
rule often employed to reach foreign companies in their home countries where their acts violate
the laws of the United States - such as antitrust laws. The effects of the foreign company's act
interferes with the trade policies of the United States. "Similarly, in a treasure salvage case, the
acts of the intervenor have the effect of interfering with the policies of the United States . . .
[in] protecting the right of fast salvor." Id. at 874-75.
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any one state,2"' rights of protective intervention should not be so dif-
ficult to justify. In view of the importance of the world's archaeological
and culturally significant sites, and the ineffective enforcement provi-
sions of the existing body of international law surrounding cultural prop-
erty, recognition of a new norm should emerge in limited and controlled
settings: the right of foreign states, or an international body representing
foreign state interests, to intervene in the domestic preservation policies
and practices of host states, and in their territorial sovereignty if neces-
sary, where that state is not protecting immoveable cultural property
from inter alia war, elements, developers, and/or looters. Despite the
previously mentioned difficulties associated with justifying such a posi-
tion, it has been recognized that the initially dominant notion of national
patrimony is slowly giving way to an implicit acknowledgement of the
legitimacy of the doctrine of the common heritage of mankind." 6 And,
if one accepts the doctrine of the common heritage of mankind, then the
human community has the right to equal access," 7 even if that right
requires intervention in territorial sovereignty for legitimate protective
reasons.
However, justification of intervention for cultural protection must be
certain to avoid any overt or hidden attempts by archaeologists, govern-
ments, or historians at "exploitative scholarship"2 " designed to plunder
for profit or collection-building if the common cultural heritage is to
successfully take on inherent rights of access. Further, as with interven-
tion for humanitarian purposes,2"9 any intervention to protect mankind's
235 Mark F. Lindsay, The Recovery of Cultural Artifacts: The Legacy of Our Archaeological
Heritage, 22 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 165, 173 (1990).
216 See generally Thomason, supra note 65, at 48 (citing various General Assembly resolu-
tions since 1973 which show three basic trends in cultural property views, and indicating that
"[flinally, and most importantly, the notion of national cultural patrimony which was prevalent
throughout the developing world in 1973 comes to co-exist with the concept of common heritage
of mankind[]").
237 Id. at 65.
238 "If a specialist is willing to live off the ancient or modem culture of another country and
then to cooperate in the illegal traffic of that country's art, his can only be termed exploitative
scholarship." Coggins, supra note 2, at 265. My reference to this term indicates its applicability
to any other covert motivation by those who gain access to another country's archeological sites
under the guise of protective intervention, only to convert that entry into their own manipulative
purposes.
2 See generally Crabb, supra note 37, at 268, indicating that:
[H]umanitarian international law in order to function must observe the
strictest neutrality as between antagonistic parties . . . . Organizations
and persons seeking to perform humanitarian actions in a state can do
so only with the consent of that state and hence cannot be perceived
by it as antagonistic or partial in favour of its opponents, international
or domestic.
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cultural heritage must observe strict neutrality between antagonistic polit-
ical parties if entry is to be accepted by the host state and the interna-
tional community as legitimate and ultimately beneficial. Therefore,
uncompromising neutrality must be the cornerstone of any protective
programs sanctioning intervention.
Arguments of national patrimony and territorial sovereignty take on
emotional appeal when further viewed in the context of economic reali-
ty. It is significant that many "relic-rich" countries - e.g. South Ameri-
can, African, and Asian states - have populations which at the present
time have very severe problems of economic underdevelopment, accom-
panied by malnutrition and disease which continually lower the quality
of life.t It cannot be forgotten throughout this more idealistic argu-
ment that a State sometimes does not possess the necessary cash, per-
sonnel, equipment, or technology to supervise everything occuring within
its territory or territorial sea, including activities of clandestine excava-
tion or destruction of archeological sites." This economic reality is
particularly true after liberation from a colonial or oppressive re-
gime.t But this call for increased protection of architectural monu-
ments and archeological sites is not an argument in favor of "bricks
over butter," or "logs over lives." The purpose of permitting protective
intervention on behalf of cultural objects is not to downplay the reality
of human necessities that might co-exist with the need for improved cul-
tural protection. It is instead an argument for sanctioned assistance to
help those who cannot, or have chosen not to, protect the world's heri-
tage over which they are the present-day territorial guardians.
Economic arguments further arise in situations where the national
patrimony of cultural items is viewed as an economic resource by the
native population, appreciated more for its financial value in the illicit
trade of archeological objects than for its cultural significance to that
nation. In this regard, some view the effects of insufficient resourc-
es, neglect, mismanagement, corruption, and internal violence that de-
stroys monuments, as well as people, as much the greater threat to the
PRoTr & O'KEEFE, supra note 13, at 125.
Thomason, supra note 65, at 52.
an Id.
See PROrT & O'KEEFE, supra note 13, at 125 (discussing Costa Rica, where the locals
"speak of antiquities as 'the national patrimony,' not meaning by that an invaluable and inviola-
ble heritage, but rather a rich resource to be exploited, as minerals are mined[]"). See also Peter
A. Young, Means of Survival, ARCHAEOLOGY, Nov.-Dec. 1992, at 2 (relaying associate editor
Angela Schuster's experience in a Peruvian market in Chiclayo when a local bruja, or witch-
doctor, oblivious to the import ban on such objects, eagerly attempted to sell an artifact to her,
"its sale [being] simply another means of survivalf]").
477
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
cultural heritage of mankind. 24 Existing international funding for the
preservation of cultural property, such as the World Heritage Fund,'
cannot possibly solve all economic ills associated with such preservation
when the lack of protection by a host state is only a symptom of the
greater social and economic imbalances. The counterarguments to na-
tional patrimony and territorial sovereignty become increasingly difficult
to justify when viewed in this context, contributing to the legal fictions
associated with the protection of the common heritage of mankind.
International law already recognizes the special needs of cultural
property, however, granting exceptions for its protection under the law
when necessary - particularly in the context of the law of war. Terri-
torial intervention within a properly controlled framework, under very
limited circumstances, is merely a continuum of the existing protective
regime where cultural property is concerned. This emerging norm has
been described by scholars:
In a world organized into nation-states and in a system of international
law in which the state is the principal player, an emphasis on national-
ism is understandable. But the world changes, and with it the centrality
of the state. A concern for humanity's cultural heritage is consistent
with the emergence of international laws and institutions protecting
human rights. A slighter emphasis on cultural nationalism is consistent
with the relative decline of national sovereignty that characterizes mod-
em international law.226
It is recognized that, in developing a rule permitting intervention in
the territorial sovereignty of a state, the most serious tensions in interna-
tional law are those affecting the relative power of States, particularly
where the stakes involve a new distribution of elements such as territo-
ry.2 International law has, in fact, grown up by bits and pieces, and
is still growing.' The common interest of mankind in preserving its
cultural heritage through intervention is present because of worldwide,
not nationalistic considerations. 9 While state practice is still inconsis-
tent on this topic, there is a need to acknowledge an emerging norm of
intervention, in what would be effective protective action beyond that
expressly stated in the existing cultural treaties.
The 1972 World Heritage Convention recognizes in its preamble
2 Merryman, International Art Law, supra note 5, at 763.
World Heritage Convention, supra note 19, arts. 15-18.
Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking, supra note 48, at 852.
Goldie, supra note 204, at 106.
MERRYMAN & ELsEN, supra note 1, at 13-14.
De Jager, supra note 36, at 192.
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that national protection of the cultural heritage "often remains incom-
plete because of... the insufficient economic, scientific and technical
resources of the country where the property [is located]" and that it is
"incumbent on the international community ... to grant collective assis-
tance." '0 This collective assistance might receive better support among
the states if protective enforcement mechanisms operated more effective-
ly. Expanding the international law of cultural property to include an
internationally approved regime of intervention could raise the level of
state interest in not only its own protective practices - i.e. to prevent
external interference in their sovereign territory - but throughout the
international community, who would now have a useful and substantive
tool for cultural protection. The United Nations General Assembly long
ago recognized that "mutual knowledge and understanding of the culture
and life of nations [can] contribute to the strengthening of international
confidence and to the maintaining of peace," and that "peoples of the
world desire wide and intensified international cultural and scientific co-
operation."' Without a right of intervention, these goals remain legal
fiction to which states can continue to pay lip service, failing to allocate
sufficient effort and resources to the universally recognized goal of
protection of the world's common cultural heritage.
The fact that a concept is not universally accepted or continuously
followed by all States is not a reason to stop advocating. The existence
of war is not justification to discard the Hague and Geneva Conventions
on the law of war, or the Red Cross and its protective regime, for that
matter. Likewise, the lack of effectiveness of the World Heritage Con-
vention does not serve as pretense for removing protection of common
cultural property from the world community's priority list. We must
continue to aspire toward the ideal, the "model code" of cultural protec-
tion laws on an international basis. This guiding line should rise to its
most effective level - one with an enforcement regime that preempts
the traditional concepts of territorial sovereignty and property law. In
effect, the result must be one that includes a right of protective inter-
vention for the sake of mankind's common cultural heritage.
W' orld Heritage Convention, supra note 19, pmbl.
' G.A. Res. 1043(xi), U.N. GAOR, l1th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/3544 (1957) (This resolution
was adopted 62 votes in favor, none against, and one abstention.).
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